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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SARAH ANN ANDERSON,
Applicant/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19128

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT:
SECURITY, BARCO OF UTAH,
STATE INSURANCE FUND, AND
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants/Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a worker's compensation case involving an employee
of Barco of Utah, who was injured while in the course of her
employment.

She claims she is entitled to compensation benefits

for injuries allegedly resulting from the accident.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order granting applicant's claim for compensation benefits, holding that Mrs. Anderson suffered a 20% loss
nf

body function with 2. 5% permanent physical impairment attributable

;,,

the industrial injury and 15% attributable to pre-existing

conditions.

A Motion for Review of the Order was denied by the

Industrial Commission on March 15, 1983, and the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge was affirmed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is respectfully submitted that the Order, as ilff,,,.,
by the

Industrial Commission,

should be upheld by the Supre:.

Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 7,

1978,

Sarah Ann Anderson was employed r;'

Barco of Utah as a head presser of collars and uniforms manufacturec
at the plant.

(R,

31,

into the corner of a

117)

in question, she rar,

table while carrying

and experienced pain in her
117)

On the day

right knee as

a

number of boxes,

a

result.

(R, Jl,

She continued to work, when an hour later she twisted he:

right knee as she reached down for a bundle of collars to press,,
(R,

34,

117)

who

told

(R,

34, 117, 118)

her

She suffered pain and notified
to

continue working,

finished

the shift,

After completing the shift, she saw Dr. Pete:

Sundwall

in Kanab,

days

then allowed her to

and

so she

her supervise:,

who

told her to stay off her leg for a fe'•:
return to work.

(R,

35, 36, 118

The applicant testified she was unable to return to work because
of pain,
Utah,

so she consulted with Dr. Robert Allen,

on March 18, 1978.

in RichfieJc,

Dr. Allen ordered x-rays of the knee

which showed some problems.

(R,

37,39,118)

After showing n.

improvement, she was examined by Dr. Craig McQueen who eventuall
performed surgery on Mrs. Anderson on April 24, 1978.

He remw

damaged cartilage from the leg and shifted the kneecap back
position.

(R, 42, 118) The applicant subsequently had two

on her knee which were not related to her
2

industrial injury'

rather

to degenerative problems

mechanism.

involving the patellofemoral

(R, 118)
Mrs. Anderson was

referred to a medical panel, which

found a 5% pre-existing permanent partial impairment for a longstanding seizure disorder, a 2 .5% loss attributable to the industrial
injury, and a 10% loss of body function resulting from the abovementioned non-industrial surgery.

(R, 102, 119)

in a total of 20% loss of body function,

This results

rounded to the nearest

5%.

Dr. Boyd Holbrook also

reviewed applicant's medical

file at the request of the State Insurance Fund.
she had degenerative

He found that

joint disease of the knee and indicated

that the episode of March 7, 1978, was probably not a significant
factor

in Mrs. Anderson's problem:

"It is difficult to see that

the minimal amount of trauma which she reported would be a significant
factor in the condition of her knee or that it would be a significant
factor in precipitating the knee to the condition requiring surgery."
(R, 88)

Mrs. Anderson's treating physician Dr. Craig McQueen,
essentially agreed with the medical panel's evaluation with the
exception that Dr. McQueen found a 25% permanent partial impairment
and the medical panel gave a 20% rating.

3

(R, 136)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD AND THEREFORE CANNOT
BE CONSIDERED IN THIS APPEAL.
In

view of

the

fact

that the medical panel hearing

transcript was lost, it is appellant's responsibility to reconstruct

I

the record and to provide the court with some evidence to support
her position,

which appellant has not done.

In fact, nowhere

in appellant's brief is there a reference to the record in support
of any point,

and

respondent asserts

that

it is improper for

the applicant to make such unsubstantiated claims.
Mrs. Gardner claims
the medical panel
Dr. McQueen.

For example,

that it was error to adopt the findings of

as opposed to the findings of her physician,

She asserts

that

"Dr. McQueen had substantialli'

greater percentage of the permanent partial disability attributable
to the accident, and an additional 1 1/2 to 2 years of temporary ,
(Applicant's brief at 2)

total disability rating.•

She alsc

claims that "there were a number of relevant material tests thac
the medical panel

did not have when it rendered its decision.",

(Appellant's brief at 10)
tiated.

There are means to complete the record none of whic!i

were done.
a

However, these allegations are unsubstan·

The

record merely recognizes

25% disability rating

rating.

(R,

136)

that Dr. McQueen gav,

as opposed to the medical panel's

There

'Iii

is nothing in the record to indic 01 '

what part of Dr. McQueen's rating was attributable to the
or Dr. McQueen's assessment of
4

how long Mrs. Anderson sufferen

temporary total disability.

It was applicant's responsibility

tu see that this became part of the record below.

The Utah supreme

court has made it clear that matters which are not a part of
the record before the Supreme Court on appeal canno"t be considered
in connection with the appeal.
P.2d 128

(Utah 1978).

378, 472 P.2d 430

Matter of Estate of Cliff, 587

See also Corbet y. Corbet,

(1970).

24 Utah 2d

Since appellant raises a number of

issues that are not found in the record, and since she has made
no effort to supplement the record in support of these issues,
her claims must fail.
POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE FOLEY
WAS BIASED AGAINST APPLICANT IN ANY WAY
OR THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
The applicant would have this court believe that it
was improper for

Judge Foley to hear the case below.

as previously mentioned,
of her position.

However,

she presents no evidence in support

In any event, assuming the claimed facts have

some foundation,

appellant's contentions must fail.

The law

in Utah is well-established that "a judgment should not be reversed
in the absence of error which is substantial and prejudicial
in the sense that there would be a

reasonable liklihood of a

different result in the absence of such error."
?7

Utah 2d 261,

495 P.2d 310,

312

K. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974).

(1972).

Arnoyitz y. Tella,
See also Gilhespie

According to the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion
5

of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not effect the substantial rights
of the parties. U.R.C.P. 61.
Appellant has introduced no evidence indicating that the findings
of the Administrative Law Judge or

the

Industrial Commission

would have been any different absent the alleged prejudice of
the presiding judges, therefore their decisions must stand.
The applicant asserts that Judge Foley failed to adopt
her treating physician's
do so,

report after

he privately agreed to

and that because of this agreement her counsel did not

request a hearing on the medical panel report.
have been

improper for

the Judge to

However, it woulG

have privately contacted

counsel for applicant out of the presence of the other attorneys
involved,

and the only evidence of the call is the confirmation
In any event, no ham

letter written by Mr. Roberts.

(R,

resulted to Mrs. Anderson as a

result of this misunderstanding,

114)

since she was still allowed a hearing on the medical panel report
after Judge Foley adopted the panel's findings.
In

connection with

this

incident,

appellant clairn°

that Judge Foley in essence called her counsel a liar.
assuming the

facts

asserted to be true,

Howeve·,

all that is indicct·

is a misunderstanding between applicant's counsel and the Jud'<•
Merely because the Judge did not
6

recall such a conversation ana

dccom[Janying letter does not prove that he was inferring that
Mr

Hoberts was a liar, and there is no evidence to indicate

l hat Judge Foley became biased because of this.

In any event,

the case law in this area indicates that the incident was harmless
error.

1

For example, in Christensen y. Christensen, 18 Utah

2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967), one of the parties filed an affidavit
of prejudice to remove the Judge from the case, asserting, among
other things that "a misunderstanding of plaintiff's counsel
in a conversation had with the court" was one of the reasons
for filing the affidavit.

at 535, 536.

held, with respect to this issue that " [I] t

The Supreme Court
is obvious that the

reason assigned has no substance, since concededly it was bottomed
on misunderstanding."

at 536.

Accordingly, a misunderstanding

between Mr. Roberts and Judge Foley is not a substantial reason
to remove the Judge from the case.
Another Utah case has held that, simply because the
trial Judge stated that he did not believe the appellant's testimony
at a previous trial does not show bias.
113 Otah 14, 190 P.2d 520

(1948).

Haslam y. Motrison,

So, even if Judge Foley was

essentially calling Mr. Roberts a liar, the

case suggests

that it takes more than a Judge's disbelief of a party (or a
1 (In a recent Utah case, the court has recognized that "It has
, . become the prevailing view that most of the law concerning
because of interest applies with equal flow
L'l
• • administrative adjudicators."
Val i Conyalescent & Care
J.ru;t1tution y. Indystrial Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1982).
Accordingly, the above Utah cases discussing disqualification
of a Judge are applicable to the case at bar.}
7

party's counsel,
is biased.

in the

instant case)

Neither is it enough to claim that a Judge is "somewha'

hostile," if the record supports the
case.

to prove that tlJP ,Judi,

In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale,

judgment as in the present

121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 ,

(1952) the Court noted:
From an examination of the voluminous record,
it appears that there is evidence amply to
sustain the findings and decree, eyen thoµgh
the coµrt eyinced a somewhat hostile attitµde
towards defendants and their coµnsel. (Emphasis
added)
Appellant is also concerned about Judge Foley's statement
that it was

his policy to

This statement by the Judge,

affirm the medical panel's report,
if it was

in fact said, was me rel;

a comment on his past practice and was no indication of the Judge';
ability to weigh the evidence concerning an objection to a
panel
a

report.

Judge

is

prejudiced.•

The Utah court,

disqualified

in

"only if he

supra, stated that
is actually biased and

Haslam y. Morrison, supra, at 523.

The court further

noted that:
Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling
or spirit of ill will toward one of the litigants,
or undue friendship or favoritism toward
one. The fact that a judge may have an opinion
as to the merits of the cause or that he
has strong feelings about the type of litigation
involved, does not make him biased or prejudiced.
For example, a judge with strong feelings
about the use of liquor or violation of the
liquor laws, is not biased against a defendant
charged with a violation of the liquor laws,
unless he has some active personal hostility
toward the defendant. ..u;J.
In any event,

applicant's claims

in

regard to Juds•

Foley must be denied because Mrs. Anderson failed to comply wit:
8

Huie

63 (b)

of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or otherwise

make a proper objection.

This

rule provides for

a filing of

an affidavit when a party believes the judge has a bias or prejudice.
rt states further that:

Every such affidavit shall state the facts
and the reasons for the belief that such
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed
as soon as practicable after the case has
been assi9ned or such bias or prejudice is
.l:ulQjw.
(emphasis added)
Assuming appellant's allegations to be true,

she should have

filed an affidavit as soon as practicable after these biases
became known at
As the
hearing

the medical panel

record stands,
the

hearing on April 16, 1982.

no objection was made

case until

to Judge Foley's

February 9, 1983, and this was only in

the form of a Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission.
(R, 139, 140)
counsel for

In fact,

in a letter dated September 8, 1982,

appellant wrote to Judge Foley requesting a decision

in the case.
it was error

(R, 134)
for

Certainly appellant cannot claim that

Judge Foley to

have issued a

ruling in this

matter after she urged him to do so.
According to Utah case law, if an affidavit of prejudice

is filed too late there is no violation of Rule 63 (b).
y_._

Dinsdale,

121 Utah 359,

of prejudice was filed
himself.

242 P.2d 297

(1952),

In Lepasiotes
an affidavit

and the trial court failed to disqualify

The Supreme Court affirmed this action, stating:
It is to be noted that such affidavit was
filed after the trial had comenced, and its
contents had to do with matters alleged to
have existed long before the trial and a
statement by the court during the trial.
9

Under these circumstances, the filing o(
such affidavit was untimely and hence Rule
63(b), U.R.C.P., was not violated.
This
is particularly true in view of the fact
that the evidence supported the decree regardless
of any statements made by the court.
.lQ. at
297.
Extending this reasoning to the present case, it followr
that since the applicant filed

no affidavit of prejudice ar,:

didn't object to Judge Foley in any form until after the Administrative

Law Judge

had

rendered a decision, such objection mus·

be viewed as untimely, resulting in no violation of Rule 63(b),
POINT III
IT WAS NOT INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR JUDGE ALLEN TO SIGN
AN ORDER MEMORIALIZING THE ORDER
ISSUED BY JUDGE FOLEY.
In

reviewing the

re co rd,

it appears that Judge Timotb:

C. Allen, who issued the Order dated January 25, 1983, was initial!:
the attorney for defendant Second Injury Fund.
prohibition that

reads:

There is a statutor:

"Except by consent of all parties, no

• • • Judge • • • shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding:

(3)

•

when he has been attorney for counsel for eithe:

party in the action or proceeding.•
(1953).

However, this provision is not absolute.

Court has
would
a

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-7-:
The Utah Suprw

repeatedly stated that unless an error,

if committed,

have such an adverse effect upon the trial that there

reasonable liklihood

reached,

that a different

the verdict must be sustained.

result would have be:
See Rigtrup y. Stawbe.:.....

Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977), and Paull Y ZiQIL
First National

18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966).

10

Accardi:

Lo the evidence,

there is no reasonble liklihood that had Judge

1111en not been assigned to this case, the result would have been
different.

Judge Allen merely put in written form what had already

been decided by Judge Foley at the time of the medical panel
hearing.
panel

The

re co rd

indicates that at the time of the medical

hearing, Judge Foley informed appellant that the findings

of the medical panel would be admitted into evidence and that
the applicant's objections would be dismissed.

(R, 136)

Judge

Allen's order dated January 25, 1983, was in response to Mr. Robert's
letter to Judge Foley requesting a decision in the case.

134)

(R,

As noted in Judge Allen's order:
After hearing the testimony of the treating
physician, the panel chairman did not change
his opinion regarding the applicant's impairment.
It appears the panel reviewed all of the
medical evidence, the medical panel report
should be admitted into evidence, and the
objections filed by the applicant should
be dismissed.
I t appears fr:om the file that
the applicant's counsel was adyised of this
fact at the termination of the hearing but
so that the record may be clear an Order
to that effect will be issued.
(Emphasis
added)
(R, 136)
It is clear that it was harmless error for Judge Allen

to have issued the foregoing order first of all, because he was
merely making a

record of Judge Foley's decision and did not

exercise any discretionary function,

and secondly, because there

is substantial evidence to support this decision, considering
the medical panel's findings and the coinciding report of Dr.
Holbrook.

(R, 87, 88, 97-103)
Appellant also

claims
11

that since the

transcript of

the medical
a

panel

new hearing.

hearing

was

lost,

she should be entitled

(appellant's brief at 16,

11)

o:

In support

this contention she cites Reliance National Life Insyrance
y,

Caine,

20

Utah

2d 427,

439 P.2d 283

(1968).

The

case

granted a new trial because the incomplete record of the testimon.
did not support the
the

instant case,

trial

court's

although the

findings

record

and

judgment,

Ir

is incomplete, there

10

sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding in the
form of medical reports and the Administrative Law Judge's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

Therefore, a new hearino

is unnecessary.
POINT IV
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW DICTATES
THAT THE COMMISSION'S DECISION BE UPHELD,
According
set aside

to

the

Utah Code Annotated,

the Commission's

ruling only upon finding:

the Commission acted without or
(2)

That the

findings

of

Code Ann. Section 35-1-84

this Court ma;
"(l) That

in excess of its powers; [ori

fact do no support the award."
(1953, as amended).

Utal.

In addition, th1,

Court stated in Ogden Standard Examiner y. Industrial Commission,
663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983):
Our inquiry is whether the Commission's findings
are "arbitrary and capricious," or "wholly
without cause" or contrary to the "one inevitable
conclusion from the evidence" to support
them.
Only then should the Commission's
findings be displaced.
Martinson y. W.M. Insurance Agency,

606 P.2d 256,

258-259 (Ut,,

1980), also discussed the appropriate standard of review as follows
12

When the Commission remains unpersuaded on
a question of fact, this Court does not disagree
therewith and compel such a finding unless
the evidence is such that all reasonable
minds would so find, and the court would
thus so rule as a matter of law.
On the
contrary, if there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence (or lack of evidence) such
that reasonable minds acting fairly thereon
could remain unpersuaded, this Court does
not upset the determination made.
See also;

Kaiser

(Utah 1981);
(Utah 1977);

Steel Corporation v. Manfredi, 631 P.2d 888

Clinger y. Industrial Commission, 571 P.2d 1328
Sayage y. Industrial Commission, 565 P.2d 782 (Utah

1977).
The

foregoing

standard of

Commission's decision be upheld.

review dictates

that the

The Utah Code states that;

The commission, upon referral of a case to
it by an administrative law judge, or upon
a motion being filed with it to review its
own order, or an administrative law judge's
supplemental order, shall review the entire
record made in said case, and, in its discretion,
may hold further hearings and receive further
evidence, and make findings of fact and enter
its award thereon. The award of the commission
shall be final unless set aside by the Supreme
Court as hereinafter provided.
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.54 (1953, as amended).
provides that the commission is to
the discretion to

This statute

review the record and has

receive further evidence if it is offered.

The applicant has already been provided with the safeguard of
this three-man panel who evaluated the evidence, and their decision
s h<Jul d stand.

The final decision in any case before the Commission

made by the three Commissioners.
filed,

If a Motion for Review is

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order become
13

advisory in nature.

The Commission reached an independent decisio,,

as provided by statute and awarded significant benefits to u,,
appellant.

She is simply dissatisfied and wants more.
The facts

with all

must be interpreted by the appellate court

inferences

The appellant asks
found

favorable to sustaining the trier of fact,
this Court to

reweigh the facts.

The facts

by the Administrative Law Judge were based not just ot

what was said, but on his observations of the witnesses and should
be accorded great weight.
on substantial facts

The Commission's decision was based

and the appropriate law was applied.

holding was not arbitrary,

capricious,

Th;

wholly without cause,

or in excess of the Commission's powers, and the evidence presented
by the applicant is far from "substantial" and "uncontradicted,'
It is within the discretion of the Administrative La•
Judge to adopt the findings of an impartial, disinterested medical
panel as opposed to the plaintiffs personal physician.
CONCLUSION
The
is nothing

Commission's decision

in the

record to

should

be upheld.

There

indicate that either Judge Fole 1

or Judge Allen harbored any kind of bias or prejudice against
the applicant or her attorney.
by the Comrniss ion's

That prejudice, if any, was cu:ei

review of the case.

No claim is made thr

the Commissioners were biased against the appellant.
tantly,

More impt'

there is no evidence that indicates a different

would have been

reached had another Administrative law Judgf

heard the case at bar.
14
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